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University of Minnesota Duluth
Two central trends in recent meta-ethics have been a resurgence of interest
in so-called “non-naturalist” realism and a shifting of focus away from moral-
ity and toward normativity conceived of more broadly to encompass practi-
cal and epistemic norms. The latter development arguably promises real
progress, as it concentrates attention on the purest and most general form of
some of the central meta-ethical questions. The former development is more
controversial. Some of the leading proponents of the new non-naturalist nor-
mative realism have sought to finesse its alleged explanatory shortcomings by
rejecting certain explanatory demands as misguided.1 Ralph Wedgwood’s
The Nature of Normativity2 explicitly rejects this strategy. Instead, it offers an
ambitious and systematic defense of an avowedly Platonist realism about the
normative.
The core of Wedgwood’s meta-ethic is the idea that while normative prop-
erties are irreducibly nonphysical, our access to them can be explained by
the fact that our status as thinking beings depends upon our instantiating
intentional properties that are essentially interdependent with these norma-
tive properties. Wedgwood’s development of this idea is the most sophisti-
cated and explanatorily satisfying account yet offered that instantiates both
of the recent trends mentioned above. It thus constitutes a wonderfully
1. Contemporary normative realists who defend this sort of quietist strategy include Scanlon (T.
Scanlon, “Metaphysics and Morals.” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Associa-
tion, 77.2 [2003], pp. 7–22; What We Owe to Each Other [Belknap, 1998], ch.1; and his 2009 Locke
Lectures); D. Parfit, “On What Matters,” ms. of July 2009 §104; J. McDowell, “Virtue and
Reason,” in Mind, Value, and Reality (Harvard University Press, 1998), pp. 50–73; and (more
controversially) perhaps R. Dworkin, “Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe It,” Philoso-
phy and Public Affairs, 25 (1996), pp. 87–139. For doubts about the prospects of this quietist
approach, see T. McPherson, “Against Quietist Normative Realism,” ms. of June 23, 2009,
http://www.d.umn.edu/~tristram/Against quietist normative realism June23-09.pdf (accessed
October 13, 2009); S. Street, “Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Rethink It,” ms. of Decem-
ber 2008. For an important related discussion, see S. Svavarsdottir, “Objective Values: Does
Metaethics Rest on a Mistake?” in B. Leiter (ed.), Objectivity in Law and Morals (Cambridge
University Press, 2001), pp. 144–93.
2. R. Wedgwood, The Nature of Normativity (Clarendon Press, 2007). All undated citations are to this
book.
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ambitious test case for philosophers interested in seriously assessing the new
normative realism.
Wedgwood aptly describes his book as “aggressively intersubdiscipli-
nary” (p. vii): It is packed with arguments that range through semantics,
metaphysics, the philosophy of mind, and epistemology. As a result of both this
scope and the book’s architectonic abstraction, it will prove a daunting (if
absorbing) read even for those with prior interest in its central questions.3 With
such an ambitious book, a reviewer must pick and choose, and here I will focus
on a series of central issues that arise from the book’s core metaphysical and
epistemological arguments. I begin by sketching the book’s central argumen-
tative thread (section 1), before plunging into Wedgwood’s interpretation and
defense of the book’s core claim that the intentional is normative (section 2). I
then examine his discussion of reduction and supervenience (section 3), and
close by considering his account of the epistemological implications of his view
(section 4). I argue that there are serious problems with both the metaphysical
and epistemological elements of Wedgwood’s view. Inevitably, this paper
focuses on these problems, which risks obscuring how much there is to admire
and learn from in this book: Almost any diligent reader will come away from
it with a richer grasp of the possible forms that normative realism might take,
and of the dialectical challenges facing these views.
1. An Overview of the Argument
The book is divided into three parts, which develop the semantics, metaphys-
ics, and epistemology of Wedgwood’s view, respectively. In this section, I
sketch the outlines of Wedgwood’s argument, beginning with his discussion of
semantics. Wedgwood accepts a version of normative judgment internalism charac-
terized by two principles:
NJI1: Necessarily, if one is rational, then if one judges “I ought to F,” one
also intends to F (p. 25).
NJI2: Necessarily, if one judges anything of the form “I ought to F,” then
one also has a general disposition to intend to do whatever one judges that
one ought to do (p. 28).
The alleged truth of these principles (given certain background conditions)4
makes normative judgments distinctive, because of the intimate connection to
3. Wedgwood notes that given the complexity of his topic, the confident voice with which he
typically states his conclusions is slightly misleading (p. 12). This paper should be read with a
similar presumption of authorial epistemic humility, not least regarding my efforts to interpret
this challenging text.
4. The conditions that Wedgwood identifies include the absence of relevant uncertainty and the
knowledge that one’s intention would make a significant difference in the chance of one’s
performing the intended action (pp. 30–31). NJI2 seems to me to need more fundamental
revision. Suppose that Hera is an ordinary and competent agent who possesses the concept
practical ought and who understands and accepts NJI1: The claim that if one is rational, then
if one judges that one ought to F, then one intends to F. Hera, however, is perverse: She wants
to become irrational in just the respect mentioned in NJI1. It seems possible that she could satisfy
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intention that each posits (p. 32). It is hard to overstate the significance of this
connection for Wedgwood’s argument. Not only does it form the foundation
for his central metaphysical project, but it also serves as a central dialectical tool
in his arguments against competing accounts of the semantics of the normative
that attempt to explain the truth conditions of normative propositions by
appeal to conceptual analyses or causal connections (ch. 3).
After rejecting the expressivist approach to moral semantics (ch. 2),5 Wedg-
wood offers what he takes to be the sole semantic account that can adequately
explain the truth of normative judgment internalism: a kind of truth-
conditional conceptual role semantics (ch. 4). On his view of concepts, the
nature of a concept is given by the basic rules of rationality that govern its use
(p. 82). These rules in turn determine the semantic contribution of a concept to
propositions of which that concept is a part. Wedgwood offers an account of
the concept practical ought, according to which to believe that I ought to
bring it about that p at t is to be rationally committed to making p part of my
ideal plan about what to do at t (p. 99). This conceptual role for practical
ought is intended to explain why the version of normative judgment internal-
ism that Wedgwood accepts is true. He goes on to argue that his conceptual
role semantics for “ought” can explain the ways in which the semantics of the
word “ought” is context sensitive and can vindicate the principles of so-called
“standard” deontic logic, which postulates a logical connection between what
ought to be and what would be best (ch. 5).6
The first part of Wedgwood’s central metaphysical project is to explicate and
defend his version of the claim that the intentional is normative (ch. 7). He
understands the normativity of the intentional as the thesis that intentional
states are essentially regulated by normative standards. He suggests that rela-
tion to intentional properties is also essential to the nature of normative prop-
erties. He thus claims that the intentional and the normative are “essentially
interdependent” (p. 175). This thesis provides a general metaphysical explana-
tion for the intimate connection that normative judgment internalism suggests
holds between normative judgment and intention. I examine these ideas in
more detail in section 2.
Wedgwood argues that intentional and normative properties, so conceived,
cannot be reduced to physical properties (pp. 181–4). He then argues that such
a nonreductive view faces the challenge of explaining specific supervenience
this desire by carefully training herself to lose the general disposition to intend to do what she
judges that she ought to do. Intuitively, the loss of this disposition in this way does not deprive
her of possession of the concept practical ought. Rather, it seems that she can now correctly
judge that she has become less rational in virtue of failing to as reliably respond to her
ought judgments as she should. If this description of the case is correct, then NJI2 is false:
Hera can judge that she ought to F without having the relevant disposition.
5. C.S. Jenkins, “The Nature of Normativity,” Analysis, 69.1 (January 2009), pp. 156–66, §2, has
raised important questions about the argument of this chapter, as has Jamie Dreier in his 2008
Madison Metaethics Workshop presentation “When Do Goals Explain the Norms That
Advance Them?”.
6. Helpful critical discussion of elements of the first part of the book can be found in M. Schroeder,
“The Nature of Normativity,” Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, March 2008, http://
ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=12523 (accessed October 13, 2009).
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facts, such as the fact that, necessarily, anyone who instantiates a certain
physical property (perhaps C-fiber firing) is in pain (p. 203). Wedgwood’s
response to this challenge is perhaps the single most interesting argument in the
book, requiring him to defend a distinctive view of metaphysical modality
(ch. 9). I explain and critique this defense of the irreducibility of the normative
and the intentional in section 3.
Finally, Wedgwood explores the epistemic implications of his nonreductive
metaphysics of the normative. His central argument here defends a founda-
tionalist epistemology of the normative partly grounded in the metaphysical
view just sketched. Wedgwood argues that because it is essential to the capacity
for a given mental state type that one be disposed to use that state in rational
ways, the intuitive normative judgments generated by such a capacity are
basically justified (ch. 10). I examine this argument in section 4.
Wedgwood argues that his distinctive version of foundationalism has a
number of important implications. First, he suggests that it vindicates moral
philosophers’ use of the method of reflective equilibrium,7 as well as the less
developed pressures to coherence in normative belief experienced by the folk
(pp. 242–7). Second, he claims that it permits him to defend a “Kantian”
conception of the apriority of normative epistemology, according to which a
priori knowledge is that which our cognitive capacities “supply out of them-
selves” (pp. 248–57). Finally, he uses it to develop a novel approach to the
currently fashionable debate about the epistemic implications of disagreement
with one’s “epistemic peers” (pp. 258–63).
This whirlwind survey barely touches on the key elements of Wedgwood’s
ambitious project. In the remainder of this paper, I explicate and challenge
three such elements. I begin with his account of the relationship between the
intentional and the normative.
2. The Normative and the Intentional
Wedgwood’s central project in the metaphysics of normativity is to elucidate
and defend the view that he expresses by the slogan “the intentional is norma-
tive,” to show that intentional and normative properties cannot be reduced to
physical properties and to defend the coherence of this nonreductive view. This
section examines the first part of this project. Wedgwood calls the normativity
of the intentional the “key to metaethics” (p. 2). This is only slightly hyperbolic,
as accepting it would transform our understanding of the metaphysics of the
normative, tying it closely to central debates in the philosophy of mind, and
recasting the debate concerning the causal efficacy of the normative.
Wedgwood develops his account of the normativity of the intentional within
an essentialist conception of metaphysics. Rather than taking facts about
essences to be reducible to modal facts, Wedgwood suggests that facts
7. Compare J. Rawls, “The Independence of Moral Theory,” in S. Freeman (ed.), Collected Papers
(Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 286–302; “Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics,”
Philosophical Review, 60 (1951), pp. 177–97; A Theory of Justice, revised edition (Belknap, 1999).
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about essences are the fundamental modal facts that (together with certain
contingent facts, about which more in section 3) explain all other modal facts
(pp. 142–3). This essentialism colors all of Wedgwood’s metaphysics. Most
fundamentally, it leads him to conceive of his central metaphysical projects as
attempts to provide “real definitions” that state the essences of philosophically
interesting properties (p. 140). Wedgwood thus glosses the intentionality of the
normative as the claim that intentional and normative properties are “essen-
tially interdependent” (p. 175). This in turn is understood as the claim that the
correct account of the essence of each normative property must mention
intentional properties, and vice versa.
The argument that the normative is essentially intentional appeals to
the conceptual role semantics defended in the first part of the book. There,
Wedgwood argued that the essential role of the concept practical ought
mentions a certain type of intentional state: plans (p. 175). Wedgwood accepts
a noncircularity constraint on reduction, such that a reductive account of
Fs cannot refer to or quantify over Fs (p. 177). He suggests that this constraint
entails that the role of plans in the essence of the concept practical ought
blocks the possibility of a reduction of plans (and thus of intentional properties
generally) to normative properties.8 The normative thus essentially involves
the intentional.
The other half of Wedgwood’s essential interdependence thesis is the claim
that it is the essence both of every concept and of every propositional attitude
type that its possession tends to be causally regulated by certain normative
standards: standards of correctness and rationality (p. 161). Wedgwood
defends this thesis in two stages. He begins by suggesting that what propo-
sitional attitudes and concepts figure in an individual’s thoughts are fixed by
the dispositions of that individual, perhaps together with the dispositions of
his/her community.9 He next argues that it is only an individual’s essentially
rational dispositions that fix the identity of the attitudes and concepts that
he/she possesses (pp. 167–9). This view contrasts with the familiar holistic
conception of concept possession, according to which all of an individual’s
dispositions are relevant to the individuation of the concepts that they
possess.
Wedgwood takes it to be a corollary of this point that every thinker who
possesses a concept has a disposition to use it in an essentially rational way (pp.
169, 235). For example, he suggests that it is plausible that it is essential to the
possession of the concept if that one be disposed to accept certain inferences of
the modus ponens form. This view does not have the absurd consequence that no
8. Given how crucial this argument is to Wedgwood’s metaphysical project, it would be strength-
ened by a clearer explanation of why more complex reductive possibilities are ruled out. For
example, if being a plan could itself be reduced to something non-intentional (e.g., some complex
of dispositional properties and normative properties other than the practical ought),
Wedgwood’s analysis of the concept practical ought would be compatible with the reduction
of the intentional to the normative.
9. Wedgwood’s brief arguments for this intuitively attractive idea (pp. 165–6) are unsatisfying, as
they seem, at best, to suggest that the dispositions of concept users play some role in individuating
the concepts they use.
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one ever uses a concept incorrectly or irrationally. This is because possession of
a rational disposition for the use of a concept is compatible with the possession
of other, irrational dispositions for the use of that concept. For example, an
irrational disposition might compete with a rational disposition, in the way that
someone’s disposition to avoid wearing paisley might compete with his/her
disposition to wear green, thereby explaining his/her failure to wear a green
paisley shirt. Another disposition might also mask a rational disposition, as
packing materials enclosing a vase can mask its fragility.10
Wedgwood’s argument for his central claim that an individual’s essentially
rational dispositions fix the identity of his/her mental states begins with two
modest points: First, that it would be implausible to count a thinker as possess-
ing a concept if they had no disposition to use it in any rational way, and
second, that a concept could be possessed by a thinker who had no dispositions
to use it in any irrational way (p. 168). The crux of his argument, however,
seems to be the intuitive supposition that the possession of a concept is “a
cognitive power or ability” (p. 169, emphasis his). This, Wedgwood thinks, tells
against the idea that someone’s possession of a concept could depend, even in
part, upon irrational dispositions.
This argument is supposed to show that we need to invoke rationality in
order to properly understand concept and attitude possession. This would
suffice to show that the intentional is normative, provided that rationality
cannot itself be reduced to more basic intentional properties. Wedgwood seeks
to rule out this reductive possibility by claiming that the rational disposition
that is essential to the possession of a given concept must involve responsiveness
to a normatively specified condition. His argument for this is that a rational
disposition necessarily involves sensitivity to a host of defeating conditions. For
example, it is arguably irrational to simply be disposed to infer q from the
beliefs that p and if p then q. This is because the rationality of this inference
would be defeated by any condition that entailed that one ought instead to
abandon one’s belief that p or one’s belief that if p then q. Wedgwood grants that
one could have a host of separate (intentionally specifiable) dispositions that
were functionally equivalent to the disposition to be sensitive to the normative
feature being a defeating condition. He argues, however, that if the dispositions are
separate in this way, it could just be a fluke that one happens to have them all,
and he suggests that manifestation of such fluky dispositions may not count as
rational thinking (p. 171).
Wedgwood’s thesis that rational dispositions “. . . cannot be specified
without mentioning normative properties and relations” (p. 171) is complicated
by an important concession: He grants that it may in fact be, in principle,
possible to specify every rational disposition in purely intentional terms (p. 172).
This means, for example, that it may be possible to specify in intentional terms
the disposition to infer q rationally from the beliefs that p and if p then q. Such
a specification would be extremely complex, because it would have to include
as constituent elements dispositions to be sensitive to all of the (intentionally
10. Compare M. Johnston, “How to Speak of the Colors,” Philosophical Studies, 68 (1992),
pp. 221–63, for the idea that dispositions can be masked in this way.
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specified) defeating conditions for this inference. This possibility is inconsistent
with Wedgwood’s original thesis, and he thus retreats to the claim that such
intentional specification would not “trivialize” the normativity of the inten-
tional (p. 172). It is difficult to interpret this claim. My best hypothesis is that
Wedgwood intends by it to point out that even this sort of possibility is
inconsistent with the holistic account of concept individuation that he takes as
his central target. Thus, the claim that rational dispositions can be specified in
this way entails that only certain of one’s dispositions for the use of a concept
are relevant to the specification of that concept.
While thus, perhaps, inconsistent with holism, Wedgwood’s concession does
seem consistent with the reduction of the normative to the intentional. To be
rational, on such a gloss, would just be to have the relevant complex inten-
tionally specifiable dispositions. This reductive possibility endangers his claim
that the normative and the intentional are essentially interdependent. However,
Wedgwood’s larger argument can survive the truth of this reductive hypothesis.
This is because (as we shall see in the next section) his argument for Platonism
focuses on intentional properties. The possible reducibility of normative prop-
erties to the intentional is thus compatible with the irreducibility of both of
these types of properties to the physical.
Even given these concessions, I am unconvinced by the structure of Wedg-
wood’s account of concept possession. Crucial to this account is the thesis that
because a thinker’s essentially rational dispositions fix what concepts he/she
possesses, possession of the essentially rational disposition for the use of a
concept is both necessary and sufficient for the possession of that concept. Both
elements of this claim are dubious.
Consider first the sufficiency claim. Suppose that Aphrodite possesses a
disposition that would be the essentially rational disposition for using the
concept or by, inter alia, mentally tokening the word “or.” According to
Wedgwood, this entails that she possesses the concept. Suppose, however,
that this disposition is never exercised. For example, suppose that Aphrodite
possesses a large set of competing and masking dispositions for the use of
“or” that lead her to use it consistently in a way closer to the way that
competent speakers typically use “and.” Or, suppose that these dispositions
lead her to use “or” in a way that displays no semantically interesting pattern
at all. The holist (but not Wedgwood) seems able to say the plausible thing
about at least some natural ways of filling out this story: despite possessing
this disposition, Aphrodite does not possess the concept or.
Consider next the alleged necessity of possession of the essentially rational
disposition for the use of a given concept. Wedgwood’s account of the concep-
tual role of or (pp. 83–84) suggests that on his view, the essential rational
disposition for its use is to be disposed to accept p or q whenever one (not
irrationally) accepts p and whenever one (not irrationally) accepts q. Consider
Athena, a once normal user of “or” who has fallen under the sway of a
heterodox logician. The logician convinces her completely that while the
standard norms for reasoning from beliefs of the form p or q are correct, it is only
permissible to infer to a belief of the form p or q if one both accepts that p and
accepts that q. With practice, Athena loses her old general dispositions for using
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or, replacing them with those called for by the logician’s norms.11 Athena is
able to defend the correctness of her usage with considerable facility, deploying
fallacious but seductive arguments she has learned from the logician. I take
Athena, so described, to clearly be a (deeply misguided!) user of or. This is a
problem for Wedgwood’s account of concept possession because Athena lacks
the general disposition essential to the rational use of this concept.
Consider two ways that Wedgwood might seek to accommodate these cases
(for the sake of brevity, I set aside Aphrodite and focus on Athena). First, he
allows that the dispositions of one’s community (and not merely one’s own
dispositions) may play a role in fixing the content of one’s concepts (p. 165). He
could thus propose that Athena counts as using or because she possesses inten-
tions to defer to the (essentially rational) dispositions of authoritative users in
her community. This response is important because it entails that an individual
may possess a concept without herself possessing an essentially rational disposi-
tion for the use of that concept.12 However, this is insufficient to address the
objection at hand, because it is not plausible that Athena must possess such
deferential intentions in order to count as a user of or. Thus, she needs not be
prepared to offload her conceptual work with respect to or onto a relevant
body of experts, as she might be prepared to do for the concepts elm and
arthritis.13 She might rather insist that no one will change her mind about the
nature of the concept or without giving her what she can recognize to be good
arguments.
The second point that might seem to help Wedgwood is that he grants that
in order to possess a concept, one must only possess a disposition that approxi-
mates the rational pattern of responses required by that concept (p. 171). This
concession is crucial to avoid a distinct challenge to the plausibility of his view,
as surely, none of us possesses perfectly rational dispositions for the use of each
of the concepts that we possess. However, this concession does not help with
Athena, because the meaning of her use of “or” cannot be settled by what
rational disposition she best approximates. For example, despite the fact that
her use of the word “or” conforms closely to the essentially rational dispositions
for the use of the concept and, it is not plausible to take her use of “or” to mean
and.
There is a better explanation of Athena’s case. This is that possession of
certain irrational but intelligible constitutive dispositions for the use of a concept
11. Compare the discussion of the “connective” tonk in A.N. Prior, “The Runabout Inference-
Ticket,” Analysis, 21.2 (December 1960), pp. 38–39. The rules that Athena accepts for or are
in effect the inverse of those stipulated for tonk, combining the elimination rules of or with the
introduction rules of and. It is curious that Wedgwood’s account of the constitutive norms for
or, which focuses solely on the dispositional analogues of introduction rules, appears to
potentially count someone with “tonky” dispositions, but not Athena, as a user of or.
12. This point has significant implications for the evaluation of Wedgwood’s epistemology in §4
below.
13. Compare H. Putnam, “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’,” in K. Gunderson (ed.), Minnesota Studies
in the Philosophy of Science VII: Language, Mind and Knowledge (University of Minnesota Press, 1975),
pp. 131–93; T. Burge, “Individualism and the Mental,” in P. French, T. Uehling, and H.
Wettstein (eds.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy IV (University of Minnesota Press, 1979),
pp. 73–121.
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(such as Athena’s) are consistent with counting as a user of that concept. The
relevant sort of intelligibility may require certain historical facts to hold. For
example, contrast Athena’s case with that of Ares, who just decides to use “or”
with similarly irrational introduction or elimination rules. Unlike Athena, Ares
is arguably best understood as attempting to add a new (and incoherent)
concept to his idiolect, rather than as a misguided user of or.14 By itself, this
explanation does not commit one to a radical holism about concept possession.
However, it undercuts both Wedgwood’s positive account of concept posses-
sion and his central rationale for resisting holism, the idea that concept pos-
session is an ability. Athena’s dispositions for using or are a cognitive disability.
However, they are embedded in the right way within her psychology, which we
may imagine to be otherwise full of cognitive abilities. This suggests that the
intuitive appeal to the idea of a cognitive ability is itself perhaps amenable to a
reasonable holistic interpretation, and this in turn suggests that Wedgwood has
much more work to do in order to defend his claims against the concept
possession holist.15
The considerations set out in this section leave me uncertain concerning the
more ambitious links that Wedgwood claims to hold between normative and
intentional properties. The robustness of these links is put into question both by
his own admission concerning the possibility of a non-normative account of the
dispositions that constitute the nature of a concept and by the intuitive chal-
lenges that I have raised against his account of concept possession. These points
suggest an important question that I will not pursue here: How much that is
distinctive of Wedgwood’s proposal would survive fully absorbing the modifi-
cations suggested by these points?
3. Reduction, Supervenience, and Modality
The preceding section examined Wedgwood’s explication of the thesis that the
intentional is normative. According to Wedgwood, the upshot of this thesis is
that normative and intentional properties are “essentially interdependent.”
This means that either both the intentional and the normative are reducible to
more fundamental kinds, or neither is. Wedgwood argues that neither type of
property can be reduced. In this section, I examine Wedgwood’s argument
against the reducibility of these classes of properties and raise what I take to be
serious difficulties for the resulting view. I begin by sketching Wedgwood’s
conception of reduction in more detail.
14. Those who, like Wedgwood (pp. 172–3), deny the possibility of inconsistent concepts should
perhaps instead say that in such a case, Ares fails to express any concept by his use of “or.”
15. It is worth noting that this argument against Wedgwood’s account of concept possession is
compatible with the truth of his essentialism about concepts themselves. For example, accept-
ing my gloss on the case of Athena is compatible with thinking that the essence of the concept
or is that it is rational to accept p or q whenever one (not irrationally) accepts p and whenever
one (not irrationally) accepts q.
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Wedgwood takes reduction to be a relationship between classes of proper-
ties.16 He offers the following account of reduction:
Reduction: for property A to be reducible to property B,
1. A and B must be necessarily coextensive,
2. the necessary coextension of A and B must follow from A’s constitutive
essence, and
3. the account of the nature of A properties cannot refer to or quantify over
A properties (pp. 145–6, 177).
The second condition makes explicit the essentialist character of Wedgwood’s
account, while the third condition imposes a plausible noncircularity constraint
on reduction.
Applying this account to physical and intentional properties requires further
assumptions. First, it requires an assumption of constructibility. Basic physical
properties and relations are (roughly) those that play the most fundamental
explanatory role in an ideal physics.17 The broader class of physical properties
includes all properties that can be constructed by the recursive application of
logical (including quantificational) operations over the basic physical proper-
ties.18 Intentional properties reduce to the physical properties, on this view, if
the necessary coextension of each intentional property I with some basic or
nonbasic physical property follows from I’s essence.19
Because of the interdependence that Wedgwood has argued for between the
intentional and the normative, he could potentially avail himself of any number
of familiar arguments against the reducibility of normative properties, or
16. For a defense of the metaphysical conception of reduction, see K. Fine, “The Question of
Realism,” Philosophers’ Imprint, 1.1 (June 2001), pp. 1–30, §3. For a defense of the alternative
view that reduction is best understood as a relation between theories, see C. Klein, “Reduction
Without Reductionism,” Philosophical Quarterly, 59.234 (January 2009), pp. 39–53, especially
§III.
17. For a brief review of the difficult task of defining the physical see D. Stoljar, “Physicalism,” in
E.N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Fall 2009 Edition (Metaphysics Research
Lab, 2009), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entries/physicalism/ (accessed
October 13, 2009), §10 and §11.
18. An important strand of antireductionism is motivated by the denial of the idea that every
logically complex property constructed from A properties is therefore an A property. For
example, this idea is in the background of Fodor’s famous argument that, given multiple
realizability, special science laws and kinds cannot be reduced to physical laws and kinds
(J.A. Fodor, “Special Sciences,” Synthese 28.2 [October 1974], pp. 97–115), given multiple
realizability, special science laws and kinds cannot be reduced to physical laws and kinds. For
a brief argument in favor of the permissibility of constructing properties of a sort by application
of logical operators, see J. Kim, Supervenience and Mind (Cambridge University Press, 1993),
pp. 152–4.
19. A familiar competing account of reduction dispenses with this essentialist criterion, so that
necessary coextension is sufficient for reduction. Call this competitor the necessary coextension
account (Cf. Kim, Supervenience and Mind, p. 151; for the view that the necessary coextension must
be knowable a priori in order to suffice for reduction, see D. Chalmers and F. Jackson,
“Conceptual Analysis and Reductive Explanation,” Philosophical Review, 110 [2001], pp. 315–
61). Wedgwood briefly argues that the necessary coextension view generates counterintuitive
results (pp. 145–6).
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against the reducibility of intentional properties. He suggests in passing that
most extant arguments against the reduction of the normative are dubious
(p. 146) and focuses instead on arguing against the reduction of the
intentional.
Wedgwood focuses his attack on attempted functionalist reductions and
offers, in response, an argument that he adapts from George Bealer. The
argument begins with the following premise:
P: if one is definitely in pain, and one is considering one’s own mental state,
then one will believe that one is in pain.20
Suppose that one formed a Ramsey sentence for “in pain” according to the
usual recipe for functionalist physicalism: conjoining all of the true statements
containing “in pain,” replacing each instance of “in pain” within the conjunc-
tion with a variable, and seeking a complex physical property whose substitu-
tion for the variable made the Ramsey sentence true. Suppose for reductio that
there was a physical property P1 that played this role. Because premise P is a
conjunct of the Ramsey sentence, successful substitution would entail that if
one was definitely in P1, and was considering one’s own mental state, then one
would believe that one was in P1 (p. 183). Wedgwood suggests that this would
be true only if the property being in pain were identical to P1.
Wedgwood refers to two reasons why he thinks that we should reject such an
identity, and with it, the reducibility of mental properties to physical properties
(p. 183). His first reason is that pain is seemingly realizable by multiple types of
physical properties (p. 179). The stock example here is “Martian pain,” which
is taken to count as a species of pain in virtue of its functional profile, despite
being realized by a completely different physical mechanism than pain in
humans is.21 Wedgwood treats this sort of case as a barrier to reduction of pain.
This is puzzling, because on its face, all that this sort of multiple physical
realizability shows is that the reduction base for pain must be disjunctive. Call
the disjunctive physical property that realizes pain (i.e.: the physical property that
realizes human pain or the physical property that realizes Martian pain or . . .) Pv. On the
necessary coextension view of reduction,22 this sort of disjunctiveness is no
barrier to property reduction, because Pv can, by hypothesis, be constructed by
logical operations on basic physical properties. On this view, there is thus no
objection to the idea that pain is Pv, and Wedgwood’s argument would fail.
As we have seen, Wedgwood offers a more restrictive essentialist criterion of
reduction, but it is unclear why this account vitiates the disjunctive strategy just
mentioned. Thus, one might gloss the essence of the property of being in pain
20. As Wedgwood notes (p. 182 n.8), P in fact needs to be modified into a ceteris paribus claim
concerning when one is definitely in pain. The first modification is needed in order to escape
the objection that P would fail for subjects in the grip of theories that entail that he is not in
pain. The second is needed to avoid the objection that pain is not a “luminous” state, in the
sense introduced in J. Williamson Knowledge and Its Limits, (Clarendon Press: 2000), Ch. 4.
21. D. Lewis, “Mad Pain and Martian Pain,” in N. Block (ed.), Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology,
vol. 1 (Harvard University Press, 1980), pp. 216–22.
22. Mentioned in note 19.
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as being that property whose instantiation is caused in certain characteristic
ways, elicits certain characteristic behavioral responses, and (perhaps) possesses
a certain phenomenal character. I see no reason why the necessary equivalence
of pain to Pv could not follow from that description of the essence of pain, if Pv
just is a complex property that uniquely satisfies this characterization.
In rejecting the identity of pain with its physical realizer, Wedgwood also
mentions that he accepts an argument offered by George Bealer that provides
a sophisticated development of a simple modal intuition: Given any physical
property that in fact realizes pain, it seems possible that a being could be in
pain without having that property.23 Bealer cannot mean this just to support
multiple physical realizability of the sort that features in Wedgwood’s first
argument. This is because Bealer explicitly recognizes the difficulties inherent
in resisting the disjunctive reduction strategy that I have just offered.24 If pain
were only multiply physically realizable, then its disjunctive physical realizer
would be a necessary condition for the presence of pain. But this is inconsistent
with Bealer’s modal intuition. It is thus unsurprising that Bealer goes on to
argue for the possibility of disembodied minds (§V). However, Wedgwood
rejects this argument, and with it, the possibility of disembodied pain.25 This
leaves Wedgwood’s considered view of the details of Bealer’s argument
unclear.26
In any case, Wedgwood is convinced that pain is irreducible. However, he
notes that this conclusion faces a seemingly deep challenge from what he calls
“specific supervenience facts”: Facts that identify necessary connections
between physical and phenomenal properties. For example, he suggests that
the following is plausibly true of some physical property B (perhaps C-fiber
firing):
Super: Necessarily, if any individual y has physical property B, then y is in
pain (p. 203).
There is an explanatory challenge here: Why is it impossible for an individual to
have B but not the (by hypothesis, distinct) property of being in pain?27
23. G. Bealer, “Mental Properties,” Journal of Philosophy, 91.4 (April 1994), pp. 185–208, especially
§IV.
24. Bealer, “Mental Properties,” 187–9. For further difficulties that face the inference from
multiple physical realizability to the failure of physicalistic reduction, see Klein, “Reduction
Without Reductionism,” §III.
25. Wedgwood rejects this part of Bealer’s argument at 183n10. The more general point is clear
from Wedgwood’s account of the “fundamental essential truth” about pain at 209.
26. Wedgwood’s use of Bealer’s argument is also complicated by his focusing on being in pain (a
phenomenal property), when his official concern is to defend the irreducibility of intentional
and normative properties. This is problematic because Bealer appeals centrally to intuitions
that phenomenal properties are modally detachable from physical properties, and analogous
claims about normative or intentional properties have much less intuitive support. I return to
the implications of these intuitive differences between phenomenal properties and intentional
and normative properties at the end of this section.
27. Compare Blackburn’s famous supervenience argument against moral realism (S. Blackburn,
“Supervenience Revisited,” in Essays in Quasi-Realism [Clarendon, 1993], pp. 130–48). Note
also that if one accepts the possibility of supernatural masking, Super is false unless modified.
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One response is to accept that specific supervenience facts are metaphysi-
cally brute. Wedgwood rejects this alternative, suggesting an explanatory prin-
ciple according to which all modal facts are to be explained by facts about the
essences of things, which he understands to be the fundamental modal facts (p.
142). He notices, however, that together with specific supervenience facts like
Super, this explanatory principle can seem to force him to accept the reduc-
ibility of pain. This is because in order for the essence of pain (perhaps together
with the essences of relevant physical properties like B) to explain the truth of
Super, the essence of pain would need to include a truth that every physical
property that meets a certain physical condition (a “pain necessitating condi-
tion”) thereby necessitates the presence of pain. Wedgwood notes that, together
with the thesis that pain strongly supervenes on the physical, this entails that his
own criterion of reduction has been fulfilled: The necessary equivalence of
being in pain with some physical property would be entailed by the essence of
pain itself (pp. 205–6).
In order to resist this further argument for the reducibility of properties like
being in pain, Wedgwood must therefore deny that the essence of such prop-
erties is sufficient to explain truths like Super. His solution is to suggest that
truths like Super are explained by facts about the essence of pain together with
contingent facts about the actual world (pp. 207–10). Specifically, he appeals to
metaphysically contingent but non-accidental (i.e., nomic) regularities that are
features of a world with a given physical structure.
Developing this idea, Wedgwood suggests a partial account of the essence of
pain, according to which, roughly, pain is non-accidentally co-instantiated with
some physical property in every possible world, and if pain is non-accidentally
co-instantiated with physical property B in a world, then pain is also co-
instantiated with B in all worlds that are both physically similar to that world
and possibly relative to that world (p. 209). For example, in the actual world,
the presence of pain may be non-accidentally co-instantiated with the firing of
C-fibers. If so, it would follow from the essential nature of pain just described
that in any world physically similar to this one and possibly relative to this one,
pain is co-instantiated with C-fiber firing. Thus, facts about the essential nature
of pain and contingent facts about the nomic structure of the actual world
together suffice to explain specific supervenience facts like Super.
Wedgwood notes that this solution can only work if he rejects a fairly
standard conception of metaphysical modality. Technically, it requires reject-
ing the applicability of the axioms of S5 modal logic to metaphysical modal-
ity.28 As an intuitive matter, this involves both accepting that certain contingent
facts about a given world determine whether certain propositions are possibly
Thus, there could perhaps be a world in which y has B and also some supernatural masking
property that masks B’s pain-making. If correct, this sort of case would refute the letter of
Super, but not the worry that Wedgwood is using it to express.
28. J. Schmitt and M. Schroeder, “Supervenience Arguments Under Relaxed Assumptions,” ms.
of May 6, 2009, http://www-rcf.usc.edu/~maschroe/research/Supervenience.pdf (accessed
October 13, 2009), argue that Wedgwood’s view also requires him to abandon the charac-
teristic axiom of S4 modal logic: p→p.
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relative to that world and denying the validity of certain modal inferences, such
as that from possibly necessarily p to necessarily p (pp. 212–5).
Wedgwood offers two points in defense of the somewhat heterodox view that
metaphysical modality has this structure. First, he suggests that there is intuitive
sense to be made of the distinction between (say) the necessarily possible and
the merely contingently possible (pp. 217–8). Second, he claims that this
conception of metaphysical modality permits the view that all modal truths are
fully explained either by truths about the essences of things or by truths about
the essences of things together with certain contingent truths. He suggests that
this makes this conception attractive because it permits the intelligibility of
satisfying metaphysical explanation without positing either implausibly strong
or implausibly numerous truths about essences (pp. 219–20). In an earlier
paper, Wedgwood describes the commitment to this account of metaphysical
modality as the “price” of his nonreductivism about intentional properties.29
While this account is indeed controversial, I want to focus instead on Wedg-
wood’s assumption that this account of modality permits a sufficient explana-
tion of the relevant modal facts about normative and intentional properties.30
The issue can be clarified by examining one of Wedgwood’s own illustrative
cases. He asks us to imagine a complete physical description of a non-actual
world, p*. Now consider the proposition C:
C: if p* is true, then something is in pain.
Suppose that there is a world w1 which instantiates p* and that something is in
pain in w1. Then, on Wedgwood’s view, C is necessarily true at w1. However,
there could be another world w2 which instantiates p*, but in which nothing is
in pain. In w2, C is necessarily false. If w1 and w2 are each sufficiently different
from the actual world, Wedgwood’s interpretation of the modal logic appli-
cable to metaphysical modality ensures that relative to the actual world, neither
C nor its negation need to be necessarily true (pp. 212–3). Intuitively, we can
think of the necessary truth of C relative to w1 and its necessary falsity at w2 as
explained on his view by the holding of a certain physical–phenomenal bridge
law in w1 and the inverse bridge law in w2.
Despite his use of pain as an example, Wedgwood’s argument is supposed to
generate conclusions about the metaphysics of normative and intentional prop-
erties, not that of phenomenal states. The contrast here is crucial because the
idea that the connection between pain and its physical realizer may depend
upon some contingent nomic facts has notoriously weighty intuitive arguments
on its side.31 By contrast, there is little intuitive support for the analogous role
of nomic necessities in the case of the normative and the intentional. To see
29. Wedgwood, “The Price of Non-Reductive Physicalism,” Nous, 34 (2000), pp. 400–21.
30. For a broadly similar argument against this central element of Wedgwood’s view, see Schmitt
and Schroeder, “Supervenience Arguments Under Relaxed Assumptions,” §§6.1–6.3.
31. Most notably, the knowledge argument (F. Jackson, “Epiphenomenal Qualia,” Philosophical
Quarterly, 32.127 [April 1982], pp. 127–36) and the conceivability argument (S. Kripke, Naming
and Necessity [Harvard University Press, 1980]; D. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind [Oxford
University Press, 1996]).
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this, consider the analogue of Wedgwood’s story about proposition C, replac-
ing pain with some normative or intentional property. For example, try to
imagine two physically and phenomenally identical possible worlds, in one of
which a certain causing of pain is wrong, while in the other, it is not. I find that
I cannot believe that such a pair of worlds could both be possible. Nor can I
believe of such a pair of worlds that one contains a person thinking about
modal logic, while the other does not. Call this intuitive result the ban on
co-possibility. The crucial point is that the ban on co-possibility is strikingly
intuitively plausible for normative and intentional properties, but not for phe-
nomenal properties.
Perhaps the most promising way for Wedgwood to respond would be to
attempt to offer a theory of error concerning the intuitive judgments that
underwrite the ban. However, there are no hints in the text as to how such an
argument might proceed. Further, there would be a lot to explain away. On the
one hand, I take it that the intuition that I press in the preceding paragraph is
widespread: This explains why analogues of the conceivability argument, com-
plete with moral “zombie-worlds,” do not loom large in meta-ethics. The ban
on co-possibility may also help to account for why we are inclined to “imagi-
native resistance” toward fictions that attempt to baldly posit the moral per-
missibility of (for example) brutal slayings in the absence of sufficiently morally
mitigating circumstances.32
Wedgwood needs some such response, however, because accepting the ban
on co-possibility creates a serious explanatory burden for his nonreductivism.
Accepting the ban leaves one with three relevant options: either the ban is
inexplicable (because metaphysically fundamental), or it is explained by the
essences of things together with some contingent facts about the actual world,
or it is wholly explained by facts about the essences of the relevant properties.
Wedgwood’s desire to reject brute necessities (p. 207) rules out the first option.
He also gives good reasons for thinking that the second option is unworkable.
This is because the ban on co-possibility applies to worlds dissimilar enough
from the actual world that it is implausible that contingent facts about the
actual world could suffice to explain it.33
The remaining alternative is that the ban on co-possibility is wholly
explained by facts about the essences of normative properties. This explana-
tion, however, leads us exactly back to the reasoning that Wedgwood’s modal
maneuvers were designed to avoid. Thus, just as in his discussion of “pain
necessitating conditions” (mentioned above on page 75 of this paper), for the
essence of a normative property N to explain the ban on co-possibility, that
essence would need to identify the set of non-normative “N-necessitating
conditions.” However, this would amount to the essence of N (alone, without
the help of contingent facts) entailing the necessary coextension of N with those
conditions, and this in turn would suffice to satisfy Wedgwood’s essentialist
criterion of reduction.
32. Compare B. Weatherson, “Morality, Fiction, and Possibility,” Philosophers’ Imprint, 4.3 (Novem-
ber 2004), pp. 1–27.
33. Compare especially the last sentence of pp. 211–2, note 11.
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Wedgwood’s discussion of reduction and modality is fascinating. However,
I have argued that his emphasis on defending an alternative conception of
metaphysical modality distracts him from what, by his own lights, should be the
central challenge facing his nonreductive view. If what I have argued here is
correct, the true “price” of his brand of nonreductivism is not merely commit-
ment to an abstract thesis about the structure of metaphysical modality.
Rather, it includes sacrificing a set of powerful intuitive judgments. Indeed, an
alternative way to understand the upshot of this section is that one can seem-
ingly construct a powerful case for a reductive account of normativity by accept-
ing the bulk of Wedgwood’s metaphysical proposal while jettisoning his
counterintuitive rejection of the ban on co-possibility.
4. Knowing the Normative?
The preceding two sections have focused on Wedgwood’s metaphysics. I now
shift to one of the most exciting aspects of Wedgwood’s view: his attempt to
make his metaphysics epistemologically respectable. Here, he faces the familiar
challenge that Platonism about a class of facts makes our knowledge of those
facts totally mysterious. Wedgwood seeks not only to answer this challenge but
also to sketch a general conception of normative epistemology and to put it to
work in addressing a series of central epistemic questions.
The Platonist’s epistemological task is to improve upon Gideon Rosen’s
placid suggestion34 that:
it might simply be that we learn moral principles from our parents, which we
then refine and revise in light of experience and reflection according to a
critical discipline which we also inherit. I see no reason this procedure should
not yield knowledge of transcendent moral principles, even though our
reliability in the area would then be contingent on the lucky convergence of
our culture on roughly true moral precepts.35
Wedgwood’s account appears to do much better than this, in virtue of his
appeal to the normativity of the intentional. His general response is that,
against the standard caricature of Platonic properties as inhabiting a causally
inert “third realm,” on his view, normative properties are causally efficacious in
virtue of their mutual constitution with intentional properties (pp. 184–91). He
thus suggests that, given the normativity of the intentional, it is “. . . not
34. G. Rosen, “Blackburn’s Essays in Quasi-Realism,” Nous, 32.3 (1998), pp. 386–405, defends
only the intelligibility (and not the truth) of this sort of explanation. However, there is some
reason to deny even this, as the view appears structurally analogous to a kind of local
occasionalism that replaces God with chance. If we set aside puzzles about reference, such a
view can doubtless account for the (lucky) possession of true moral beliefs. However, one might
argue that if a person’s claim to normative knowledge is not defeated by such chanciness itself,
it should be defeated at least by his/her awareness that his/her belief in normative propositions
inescapably presupposes that he/she is lucky in this way.
35. Rosen, “Blackburn’s Essays in Quasi-Realism,” p. 398.
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surprising that there is less of a problem about our ‘access’ to such objective
normative truths than there might at first seem to be” (p. 226). This strategy
appears to promise an important advance in the defense of Platonism.
However, I will argue that Wedgwood’s way of developing the details of this
account is unconvincing.
Wedgwood begins by setting out a disjunctive requirement on rational
belief-forming mechanisms, according to which a way of forming beliefs can be
rational only (i) because we have evidence that makes it rational to regard it as
reliable, or (ii) because it is primitively rational (p. 229). He then suggests that
a way of forming beliefs is primitively rational because it has an “essential
connection to truth” (232).
Wedgwood’s understanding of this essential connection is best illustrated by
his explanation of why sensory experience is a primitively rational way of
forming beliefs. As he explains it, for a subject to have the capacity for sensory
experience is for her to have a disposition such that:
for every proposition p within [a certain] range, under normal conditions,
the subject will respond to being in a situation in which p is the case by
having a sensory experience as of p’s being the case. (231)
Wedgwood calls this disposition to respond to its being the case that p by
having a sensory experience as of p the “essential disposition” constitutive of
sensory experience. As we have seen in section 2, such an essential disposition
might be sidelined or masked by other dispositions. However, any experience
that is the manifestation of the essential disposition will be veridical. Such a
disposition is therefore essentially reliable, and thus, by Wedgwood’s principle,
primitively rational.
Wedgwood takes his account of the normativity of the intentional to entitle
him to develop an analogous case for the primitive rationality of our normative
intuitions. This case begins with the claim (discussed in section 2) that in order
to possess a concept, one must possess essentially rational dispositions for the
use of that concept. This appears to show that correct intuitive normative
judgment requires only the non-interference of dispositions that would other-
wise compete with or mask our essentially rational dispositions to form nor-
mative judgments. Thus, on his view, intuitive judgment using one’s normative
concepts is primitively rational, for just the reasons that sensory perception is.
Wedgwood defends the underlying idea that possession of essentially rational
dispositions for the use of a concept makes intuitive use of that concept primi-
tively rational in two stages. The first stage is a quick transcendental argument.
He suggests that because we could not function as agents if we lacked beliefs
about our immediate environment, we need to treat some way of forming beliefs
about our immediate environment as primitively rational (pp. 231–2). The
second stage of the argument is the claim that it is still reasonable, in the face of
this “pragmatic” point, to demand that we not treat as primitively rational any
way of forming beliefs that lacks some essential connection to the truth (p. 232).
The transcendental part of this argument is seemingly intended to rule out
external world skepticism as (practically?) unreasonable. As I interpret him,
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Wedgwood takes this to “lower the bar” for a primitively rational source of
evidence: All that is required is a reason, however modest, to prefer this sort of
source over other putative sources, such as hunches or astrology (p. 232). The
alleged essential connection to truth permits sensory perception to meet this
lower bar.
Wedgwood suggests that the role of the essential connection to truth in
this account renders it more explanatorily adequate than either coherentism
or a version of foundationalism that simply takes certain judgments to be
basically justified because they are “self-evident.” Thus, he notes that the
disposition to optimize coherence does not seem to be essentially reliable.36
He suggests similarly that the fact that a proposition is “self-evident” similarly
fails to show anything about the reliability of the mechanism that formed it
(p. 233). Thus, only his condition on rational belief-forming mechanisms
is able to provide the relevant link between epistemic justification and
truth.
In the remainder of this section, I argue against both of Wedgwood’s central
claims: That his version of foundationalism improves on these epistemological
rivals, and that it vindicates the evidential status of intuitive normative judg-
ment. I begin with the latter claim.
Wedgwood’s strategy for vindicating the evidential status of normative judg-
ment fails because the capacity for normative judgment simply does not entail
the possession of an essentially reliable disposition. There are at least three
central problems here. First, we saw in section 2 that Wedgwood himself granted
that the dispositions of one’s community (and not merely one’s own dispositions)
might play a role in fixing the content of one’s concepts. This suggests the
possibility of counting as possessing a normative concept in virtue of being
disposed to defer to others in one’s use. But such a condition does nothing to
improve one’s reliability when one is not able to consult others. The second
problem, suggested by my case of Athena (also in section 2), is that given the right
circumstances, one can seemingly possess a concept despite lacking either the
essentially rational disposition for its use or a disposition to defer to one’s
community.
A final problem follows from R.M. Hare’s claim that we would treat a
linguistic community as sharing our concept good even if members of that
community use the term “good” systematically to praise what we take to be
vicious behavior.37 If correct, this thought experiment provides domain-specific
36. Wedgwood should grant that the right sort of disposition to coherence is conditionally reliable.
This point is especially clear given his defense of the method of reflective equilibrium (p. 244).
As he notes there, dispositions to coherence are truth preserving, and perhaps (supposing that
our initial set of beliefs contains a sufficient proportion of truths), proportion of truth increas-
ing. The inverse objection to coherentism is more consistent with his view: He should com-
plain that coherentism ignores the basic rationality of reliance on sense perception and
intuitive normative judgment.
37. This adapts Hare’s “missionaries and cannibals” thought experiment (R.N. Hare, The Language
of Morals [Clarendon, 1952], pp. 146–9), which is justly famous despite its morally objection-
able rhetorical frame. Compare also the more modest (and consequently harder to resist)
variant of this thought experiment in T. Horgan and M. Timmons, “New Wave Moral
Realism Meets Moral Twin Earth,” Journal of Philosophical Research, 16 (1991), pp. 447–65.
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evidence against the thesis that possession of a normative concept like good
really requires possession of a disposition for the use of the term that would,
absent interference, generate correct substantive normative judgments.
These points refute the idea that possession of a normative concept entails
the possession of a disposition to use it in an essentially rational way. Hence, if
Wedgwood’s account of primitive rationality was correct, it would thus under-
mine his own idea that intuitive normative judgment is a basic source of
evidence.
Wedgwood’s account of primitive rationality, however, should also be
rejected.38 I set aside the obvious and deep controversies that stem from his use
of a transcendental argument and focus on the dialectic between Wedgwood,
and the coherentist and “self-evidence” intuitionist. Suppose that your only
putative sources of evidence about some subject matter were testimonial and
that you could consult an Achaean, a Trojan, or both. Suppose further that you
have no a priori knowledge at all concerning the quality of the Achaeans’
testimony. By contrast, you somehow know a priori that at least one of the
Trojans always tells the truth. However, you have no information (not even a
background probability baseline) about the quality of the other Trojans’ testi-
mony and no way of identifying the stipulated reliable Trojan.
One should surely either initially trust both the Achaeans and the Trojans,
or trust neither. (I say “initially” because the content of their testimony might
eventually provide grounds to favor or discount the testimony of one or the
other.) The knowledge that at least one Trojan is reliable appears irrelevant for
straightforward reasons: One lacks any sense of how many unreliable Trojans
there are, and thus, what chance of getting reliable information from a Trojan
one has. However, what we know about the Trojans is analogous to the feature
of sensory perception that Wedgwood argues is epistemically crucial to its
status as a basic source of evidence: While his view ensures that I have one
essential disposition to have veridical perceptions in normal circumstances, it
gives me no idea how many unreliable dispositions to perceptual appearance I
might have. Wedgwood’s essential connection to truth view thus appears to
suggest absurdly that in the analogous testimonial case, it is primitively rational
to accept Trojan testimony, but not Achaean testimony. By contrast, the
foundationalist who takes testimony as such to be a basic source of evidence,
the foundationalist who takes testimony to be inductively justified, and the
coherentist all seem equipped to vindicate the intuitively correct result: That
we should initially treat the two groups of testifiers equivalently.
For the reasons just sketched, I find Wedgwood’s distinctive version of
foundationalism unattractive. At minimum, it requires a great deal more
elucidation and defense than it receives. Unfortunately, this leaves the hoped-
for epistemic payoff of Wedgwood’s metaphysics in doubt. It seems that the
posited intimate connection between normative properties and intentional
properties should lighten the Platonist’s epistemic burden. This is because it
suggests that normative properties are causally efficacious. It should thus
38. See Jenkins, “The Nature of Normativity,” §3, for further worries about Wedgwood’s account
of primitive rationality.
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permit the Platonist to avoid the necessity of positing a miraculous faculty of
intuition that permits us to track a causally inert “third realm.” However, the
argument of section 2 showed that the relationship between the normative and
the intentional is quite complex. I have argued here that Wedgwood has not
succeeded in developing an account of epistemic access that respects these
complexities.39
Wedgwood’s development of his core commitment to the normativity of the
intentional makes good on his claim to offer Platonism that does real explana-
tory work rather than embracing metaphysical and epistemological mystery.
However, I have argued, for what I take to be powerful reasons, to doubt the
plausibility of his development of this core idea. My discussion in section 2
suggested that the alleged “essential interdependence” of the intentional and
the normative is in need of further development and defense. My discussion in
section 3 suggested that his defense of nonreductivism is even more problem-
atic. And section 4 suggested that Wedgwood’s way of developing the promise
of an epistemologically respectable Platonism was doubly flawed.
I close with a final systematic hypothesis about Wedgwood’s vision. It may
be possible to develop a defensible epistemology of the normative from his
conception of the normativity of the intentional. However, the dialectic of
section 3 suggests that this might only be because Wedgwood’s version of the
normativity of the intentional itself turns out to be inconsistent with the Pla-
tonism that Wedgwood holds dear. These doubts do not undermine my inter-
est in Wedgwood’s project. Rather, they leave me looking forward to the
further development of his ambitious vision in response to the critical attention
that this book will deservedly receive.40
39. For a largely distinct set of worries about Wedgwood’s epistemology, see Jenkins, “The Nature
of Normativity,” §§3, 5, and 6.
40. I am indebted to Mark Schroeder, David Plunkett, and Nadeem Hussain for helpful com-
ments on the draft of this paper.
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